Abstract
If one searches for a rational legal frame~lork for the financial services industry, derived from firs, principles consistently applied, one will be disappointed in reviewing the history of that legal structure in the United States.
Only ambiguous conclusions may be drawn if one wishes to justify the kinds of liberalizing measures that generally have been favored in academic circles since the mid-1970s.
The United States started with a classically liberal/negative liberty framework regarding "monied corporations," but as early as the 178Os, policymakers began to make utilitarian/positive liberty compromises. Gradually, traditional legal structures designed to encourage managerial prudence (such as double liability for banksr shareholders) eroded, and subsidies that eventually led to a severe moral hazard problem (such as federal deposit insurance) were inserted in their place.
Checks and balances that originally existed, such as a strong and competing role for the states in bank supervision and regulation, gradually collapsed into an increasingly centralized and synchronized federal regulatory system. Nevertheless, the current rhetoric of advocates of financial services industry reforms seems to have classically liberal pretensions, despite the supervisory and regulatory protections and subsidies now available to many parts of that industry.
Competition within a given class of firms (e.g., banks) for .dominance in their market segment has become transformed into competition across industry sector lines (e.g., between banks and securities firms) for dominance largely determined by governmentally provided protections and subsidies. Rhetorical consistency and sound strategy for reform would appear to require reductions of these protections and subsidies, renewed and increased competition within industry sectors (not just between different classes of protected and subsidized industries), and increased levels of manager and shareholder accountability for the conduct of their financial institutions.
I. Introduction
This paper summarizes both the history of financial services regulation in the United States and the conflicting models of political economy, or the legal framework, that lay behind that history.
The principal supervisory intervention and closure options available to financial services regulators by the late 1980s are described briefly. Many of those options were modified or even extended by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),l/ but numerous older supervisory tools that had fallen into disuse after the advent of federal deposit insurance and direct federal intervention in the capital markets affecting financial services institutions during the 1930s remain neglected.
The primary purpose of this paper is to review the legal framework for the supervision and regulation of financial services both as it has been and as it might be. Specific policy recommendations regarding expansion of the activities of one set of financial institutions across industrial sector lines into the domains of other financial institutions, or innovations in financial services supervision, are beyond the scope of --this paper.
A Brief History of Financial Services Regulation in the United States
Perpetually chartered, limited-liability, incorporated banks having as their principal liabilities deposit accounts instead of circulating notes were a novelty of the second half of the 19th century in the United States. The National Bank Act authorized "national associations" to obtain federal banking licenses in order to enable partnership and sole-proprietorship banks to join the bond-secured currency scheme, and state law also licensed banks but did not require them to incorporate. 
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In general, it was the classical liberals who lost out in those 1930s' policy debates.l2/ Thus, classical liberals need to think carefully before defending 1930s' policy reforms.
Similarly, those whose reference points are earlier, the era of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, for example, should bear in mind comparable distinctions as to appropriate models.
Hamilton was essentially a positive liberty thinker, while
Jefferson's and, to a slightly lesser degree, Madison's ideas reflect negative liberty values. Utilitarian and corporatist methods often are inconsistent with classical liberal models--a principle that should be remembered as we evaluate the supervisory and regulatory structures described below.
IV. Regulatory Intervention and Closure Options in the 1980s
Banks, bank holding companies, and thrift institutions were subject to the supervisory and regulatory intervention and closure procedures described below during the 1980s. It is worth noting that the balance-sheet test for insolvency could rely fairly safely on book-value accounting in the past (pre-1933) because national banks then held no long-term assets whose _ market value would have differed significantly from book value, or historic cost. Also, cash accounting principles were commonly used for banks prior to 1933, which meant that divergences in asset values due to the lags of accrual accounting usually did not exist.
The general transition to historic-cost accounting principles for banks occurred pursuant to a supervisory agreement in 1938 (see Mengle [I9911 and Simonson and Hempel [1992] ).
Whichever test is applied for the appointment of a national FIRREA (1989) amended the bridge bank provisions of the FDI Act to authorize the chartering of a bridge bank whenever it is determined by a court, the appropriate administrative body, or the appropriate Agency that one or more insured depository institutions are either "in defaultt1 (that is, a conservator, receiver, or other legal custodian is actually appointed) or "in danger of default"
(that is, it is determined either that the insured institution cannot meet maturing demands or obligations without federal assistance or that the insured institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that would substantially deplete all of its capital without federal assistance) .21/ Thus, the creation of a bridge bank no longer need await a chartering authority's formal closing order and becomes largely discretionary on the part of the FDIC.
After the FDIC's board of directors autho~izes the organization of a bridge bank, the OCC must charter it (12 U.S.C. FDICIA, enacted December 19, 1991, is Public Law No. 102-242. 2. Other nations1 histories either are or have been somewhat relevant to (and are often cited as possible models for) the restructuring of American legal and financial services institutions. Although those histories are interesting and often instructive, the hard fact remains that, as a matter of legal history, only the English and Scottish experiences are directly relevant to the actual evolution of the framework forthe American financial services industry. The future, of course, might be different, but the past is less mutable on this point than proponents of universal banking or expanded governmental subsidies of the financial services industry might wish to acknowledge. For detailed analysis of this issue, see Roe (1993) . 
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Good descriptions of the legal forms and structural organizations found among large banks in early American history appear in Hammond (1957) and Gibbons (1859) . A comparable description for Britain, especially for Scotland, is in L. White (1984) , pp. 23-49.
5. See A. Smith (19761, book V, chapter 1, pp. 245-282; Tansill (1965), pp. 563, 724-725; Schlesinger (1945), pp. 76-77; Mowry (1958), p. 79; and Brandeis (1914)~ esp. pp. 135-223. 6. See Hamilton (1790 Hamilton ( , 1791 Hart (1899)~ pp. 230-252, 274-288; and Smith and Beasley (1972), pp. 90-94. 7. See Jefferson (1791); Madison (1791) ; James (-1938), pp. 556-558; and Schlesinger (1945)~ pp. 76-77. 8 . This phraseology appears in Section 4 (c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (12 U.S.C. Section 1843).
9.
See, for example, Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corporation, 474 U.S. 361 (1986) , in which the Supreme Court decided, 8-0, that the Board lacked the authority to reinterpret the statutory definitions of terms like !!banku or lfcommercial loanff in Section 2 (c) of the -Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. Section 1841) so as to extend the Board's regulatory authority to nonbank banks. Such banks generally remain outside Federal Reserve regulation unless they are owned or controlled by banks or bank holding companies. On the other hand, most of the Board's orders liberalizing securities powers of the affiliates of member banks, reversing prior, limited interpretations of Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. Section 377), have withstood court challenges since the early 1980s.
10. The idea of "natural market segmentationu is discussed favorably by, among others, Stevens (1898), p. 264, and, nearly 100 years later, Minsky (1993) , who in turn credits Kregel (1992) for this idea. On the other hand, the idea of dismantling segmented or compartmentalized financial services institutions is discussed favorably by, among others, England (1993) , Kaufman (1993) , and U.S. Treasury (1991).
11.
The best-known historical analyses in favor of segmentation and compartmentalization of financial services are Brandeis (1914) and Pecora (1939) . Among the better-known recent critiques of those analyses are E. White (1986) and Benston (1990) .
For a good current restatement of the recent critiques, see Wheelock (1993) .
12. Herbert Hoover and Carter Glass were, I suppose, the leading illustrations of this proposition. See generally Hoover (1952) and Smith and Beasley (1972) .
13.
Other similar enforcement actions employed by the Agencies are the written agreement and the memorandum of understanding.
Like the cease-and-desist order, the written agreement is a formal supervisory action.
The memorandum of understanding, however, is informal. The Agencies, with respect to commercial banks, are the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC.
14. 12 U.S.C. Section 1818 (b) (6) . This section specifically lists the following types of affirmative action that affected -institutions may be required to take: 1) restitution for certain losses, 2) restrictions on asset growth, 3) disposal of any loan or other asset, 4) rescission of agreements or contracts, and 5) employment of qualified officers and employees who may-be subject to approval by the Agency. It should be self-evident that not all onerous banking regulations proceeded from FDICIA alone. 9, 1933 . (Federal Reserve ~ulletin, vol. 19 [1933 , p. 115. See also, Jones [19511, pp. 21-22.) The former condition for appointment of a conservator under Wyatt's version of Section 203 was "whenever [the OCCI shall deem it necessary in order to conserve the assets of any bank for the benefit of the depositors and other creditors thereof. . . . " In other words, no explicit finding of actual or potential insolvency was required, but former Section 203 provided explicitly that a conservator was to have all the powers of a receiver, in addition to powers necessary to operate the bank. Jones (1951) , p. 22, notes that the title tlconservator" was "akin to receiver but less harsh on the public ear." The original object of conservatorship "was to stave off creditors long enough to rehabilitate a bank rather than let it go into receivership. " (Ibid. ) 17. 12 U.S.C. Section 206, as amended in 1989 by FIRREA. Previously, Section 203 provided that a conservator had all the rights and powers of a receiver and that the rights of all parties with respect to a conservator were "the same as if a receiver had been appointed, which limited the conservator1 s capacity to maintain uninterrupted banking services (for example, claimants against conservatorships could not have obtained full satisfaction of their claims--to the possible prejudice of other claimants--without judicial approval) . Now, a judicial order might be necessary to prevent the conservator from satisfying some claims in full, to the potential detriment of other claimants.
18. 12 U.S.C. Section 205. Former Section 205 provided for termination (other than by "reorganizationM under Section 207 . [repealed in 19891 or conversion into receivership) whenever the OCC decided that it could safely be done and would be in the public interest.
19.
The knowing violations of the National Bank Act prohibited under 12 U.S.C. Section 93 were not amended by Title IX of FIRREA, which established civil money penalties for violations of the Act. Those knowing violations include the acceptance of deposits after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation of such an act. 12 U.S.C. Section 91. This prohibition against the acceptance 'of new deposits while knowingly insolvent was enforced frequently until 1934 (when federal deposit insurance commenced), but has been enforced only rarely since then and not, to the author's knowledge, within the last 20 years. and 1821 (n) . These criteria are essentially the same as those for appointment of a receiver or conservator of a national bank, except for the new balance-sheet test and having fewer than five directors, added by FDICIA.
22.
12 U.S.C. Section 1821 (n) (1) (E) , n 2 A -C , and (n) ( 5 ) (A) .
23. 12 U.S.C. Section 1821 (n) (1) (B) and (n) (3) (A) . Thus, the FDIC has virtually complete discretion to determine the composition of the liabilities and assets of a bridge bank.
24. Most of the relevant statutory amendments made by FDICIA are in the FDI Act.
See generally Carnell (1992) on prompt corrective action under FDICIA and on other legal issues related to FDICIA. On the costs of forbearance, see Woodward (1992) and Thomson (1993) .
25. See Thomson (1993) , Woodward (1992), and Carnell (1992 29. Minsky (1993) , citing Kregel (1992) , observes that "the supervision of the German banks [which is located outside the Deutsche Bundesbank, the central bank] is much closer than anything contemplated in the States. " Universal banking performs as it does in Germany, I argue, principally because of a greater and more long-standing tolerance for corporatist ideas in German society and under German law than has been the case in the United States. Many -important German financial and industrial combinations would not have been allowed under U. S. antitrust laws and doctrines that have prevailed here for the greater part of a century.
30. An important new article on this topic is Roe (1993).
31. See Neier (1993) .
NOTE ON FURTHER READINGS ON FDIC'IA
The best recently prepared sources of information on the economic and theoretical evolution of FDICIA of which I am aware are Benston and Kaufman (1992 and .
For the legal and theoretical evolution of FDICIA, see Carnell (1992) , Pike and Thomson (1992) , Todd (1993), and Wall (1993) . The most thorough
